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Abstract
Background: The creation of each edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) of psychiatry has proven
enormously controversial. The current effort to revise the ‘bible’ of disorder definitions for the field of mental health
is no exception. The controversy around DSM-5 reached a crescendo with the announcement from National
Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) that the institute would focus efforts on the development of their own psychiatric
nosology, the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) (NIMH, 2013).
Discussion: The RDoC seem to be structured around the concern that the only way to find objectivity in the
classification of diseases or disorders in psychiatry is to begin with biology and work back to symptoms. Values
infuse medical categories in various ways and drive practical considerations about where and how to divide up
constellations of already agreed upon symptoms.
Summary: We briefly argue that all nosologies are infused with values and, while we should continue to sharpen
the psychiatric nosology, normativity will permeate even the strictest biologically based taxonomy; this need not be
a bad thing.
Background
The creation of each edition of the Diagnostic and Statis-
tical Manual (DSM) of psychiatry has proven enormously
controversial. The most recent effort to revise the ‘bible’
of disease definitions for the field of mental health was
no exception. The controversy around DSM-5 reached
a crescendo last April with the announcement from the
National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) that the in-
stitute would shift their efforts and funding to the devel-
opment of their own psychiatric nosology, the Research
Domain Criteria (RDoC), with hopes that this research
will inform future iterations of the DSM and International
Classification of Diseases (ICD) [1-4]. This announcement
resulted in controversy and a flurry of media reports
alleging NIMH was rejecting the DSM, prompting a joint
statement of rapprochement by NIMH Director Tom
Insel and Jeffrey Lieberman, who was president-elect of
t h eA P Aa tt h et i m e[ 5 ] .
One source of the controversy is that the RDoC aims
to classify mental disorders according specific functional
analysis of particular genes, cells, neural circuits, and
behaviors, arguably providing a higher degree of etio-
logical validity and reliability than the current nosology.
The goal will be to hone in on particular biological
dysfunctions at various levels and link them to specific
clinical phenomena. For example, the RDoC will jetti-
son phenomenological approaches to the assessment of
post-traumatic stress disorder favored by the DSM and
ICD and instead focus on neural circuits implicated in
fear-potentiated startle and other associated conditioned
responses [6]. In so doing, varied disordered experiences
of patients will be parsed into common underlying neural
and genetic factors.
The Research Domain Criteria outlined by the NIMH
appear to be structured around the concern that the only
way to find objectivity in the classification of disorders in
psychiatry is to begin with biology and work back to
symptoms. The proposed methodology for this initiative
thus specifies that “[t]he intent is to generate classifica-
tions stemming from basic behavioral neuroscience. Ra-
ther than starting with an illness definition and seeking
its neurobiological underpinnings, RDoC begins with
current understandings of behavior-brain relationships
and links them to clinical phenomena” [1]. The proposal
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guided by “constructs” that “represent the fundamental
unit of analysis in this system” and are “constrained by
whether a particular brain circuit or area could reason-
ably be specified that implements that dimension of
behavior”. These efforts align with the broader NIMH
Strategic Plan to create “biosignatures” for mental disor-
ders. The NIMH envisions that “a biosignature could con-
sist of a genetic variant, an abnormal amount of a certain
protein, a distinct neuroimaging pattern from a brain scan,
a certain response during a cognitive test, or any number
of indicators from blood, sweat, or other biological fluids”
[2]. Concern is shared by other critics who worry that
with disorders emerging involving sex, the internet,
temper tantrums and shopping, the diagnosis of disorders
of the mind will founder in the rough seas of subjective
values and commercial interests.
Discussion
Three key assumptions about the nature of mental disor-
ders and about the role of biological data in explaining
them appear to underpin the implementation of the RDoC
and the aspirations that have motivated this pivotal
transition. First, by setting out to devise a classification
system based primarily on biomarkers and mechanisms,
the RDoC assume that mental disorders are natural
kinds that stand to be discovered and explained through
a value-neutral blend of genetics, imaging, and neuro-
science [3]. Second, in favoring this approach over that
of the DSM, the RDoC suggest that a classification
system based primarily on genetics, brain circuitry or
other biomarkers could claim more validity than a clas-
sification system based primarily on traditional forms of
clinical examination, clinical symptoms, patient history,
phenomenology, or patient narrative. Finally, the RDoC
envision that biomarkers can represent not only corre-
lates of risk for mental disorder but may also constitute
diagnostic tests for the presence or absence of a mental
disorder, implying that any legitimate mental disorder
has a potential biosignature or direct biological correlates.
These assumptions spring from a deeper philosophical
commitment that values and objectivity are incompatible.
Since significant consequences—financial, social, legal
and medical—hinge upon decisions about classification,
and since many critics inside and outside the field of men-
tal health continue to insist that definitions of mental
health, disorder, or disease are not trustworthy since they
are fraught with subjective value judgments or lack bio-
logical foundations, it should not come as any surprise
that controversy surrounds the appearance of DSM-5.
What is rather surprising is the staying power of the view
that ascribes “lack of validity” to any classification scheme
that is not principally based in “objective laboratory
measure” [4]. This view necessitates endorsement of the
premise that reference to putatively “objective” (i.e., value-
neutral) laboratory measures or biological data is the only
path to validity within psychiatric nosology. This claim is
intimately connected with a broader theory of disease-
naturalism about mental disorders according to which
psychopathology consists solely in disordered neurobio-
logical mechanisms and value-free events that take place
within the human organism. We would have thought that
by now most researchers understand science and medicine
to be a social enterprise, shot through with values be they
molecular discoveries or clinical breakthroughs.
Values infuse medical categories in various ways [7].
Values can drive practical considerations about where and
how to divide up constellations of already agreed upon
symptoms. Or they might operate at a more fundamental
level and influence what is considered to be dysfunctional
or disordered behavior in the first place. For example,
feminist philosophers have argued that political and
gender-based values about “proper” feminine behavior
have driven particular disorder categories such as histri-
onic and borderline personality disorders and premen-
strual dysphoric disorder [8]. Lastly, values inevitably
influence the clinical encounter, making diagnosis an
exercise in medical hermeneutics by clinicians who
must interpret self-reported symptoms of patients.
Many advocates of a strict biomedical model identify
these features and wish to minimize the role of values in
a classification of psychiatric disorders as they strive for
what they consider to be a more legitimate classification
scheme that “carves nature at the joints”.A c c o r d i n gt o
this naturalist view, scientific classification systems, be
they about celestial objects, insect species, types of tu-
mors, geological formations, or meteorological events,
should reflect the observer-independent structure of the
external world. To achieve this faithful capture of reality,
those building classification schemes should strive to
minimize any reference to or reliance on values [9].
Values, on this view, undermine objectivity.
For naturalists, the point of classification is to capture
what is ‘out there’, value-neutral facts about the world
that exist independently of those crafting the classification.
Naturalism thus reflects the belief that there exists a
Platonic world in which species, classes and kinds can
be objectively distinguished by identifying their pure, es-
sential properties without any reference to values [10,11].
On this view a valid DSM-5, liberated from values, and
resting on a firm biological foundation would be accurate
in all times and places. To put the point another way, a
strict value-free, objectivist interpretation of a sound clas-
sification system of disease and disorder should be valid
whether or not there are any humans interested in read-
ing, hearing or using it.
This view of classification is, however, flawed. When
critics argue that they find evidence of values shaping
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are right [7]. However, when they argue that such values
undermine or invalidate the nosology, rendering objectivity
impossible, they are wrong. The only way to understand
the categories and disorder classifications to be found in
psychiatric nosology—the DSM, ICD or one based on
RDoC—is to acknowledge they are in part value-driven
and value-laden [12,13]. A normative interpretation of nos-
ology holds that values do not undermine objectivity; they
are an essential component of objectivity in creating a
guide to mental health and illness. Even the classification
system advanced by the RDoC relies on normative,
value-driven evaluation in deciding which behavioral
characteristics constitute meaningful dysfunction and
thus merit biological investigation, and in setting out to
establish what degrees and dimensions of biological differ-
ence should be considered pathologic. Making inferences
from biological differences to pathology and determining
which problems should or should not be classified as
‘disordered’ is a project that cannot escape normative
influence.
Classification systems, including nosologies, reflect the
practical needs, values and interests of those doing the
classification and, as in the case with DSM-5, input from
key stakeholders [14,15]. What constitutes a hurricane
as opposed to a tropical storm, a particular soil type or
flood plain, a melanoma as opposed to a benign growth,
are closely tied to human interests in traveling, farming
and surviving. The fact that every classification reflects
human interests and values or that DSM-5, in particular,
reflects current human concerns and values does not
undermine its objectivity or its validity.
We see the compatibility of values and objectivity in
many cases in psychiatry. One example is borderline per-
sonality disorder, where, as we mentioned above, feminist
concerns have convincingly shown that the diagnosis has
been steeped in values. But this fact does not entail that
the diagnosis is a whole-cloth social construction. On the
contrary, the behaviors constituting the disorder are reli-
ably observed across time and space, and these behaviors
have a very real and generally negative impact on individ-
uals and communities. That is to say, most would agree
that the constellation of symptomatic behaviors of border-
line causes suffering.
Therefore, unless consensus about values is impossible,
the presence of values in motivating the creation of a clas-
sification or in shaping categories does not compromise
the effort to secure an ‘objective’ nosology. Defining men-
tal disorders requires both awareness and an incorporation
of particularly important norms and values about hu-
man beings. Values such as self-determination, dignity,
happiness and well-being serve as the pillars of psychi-
atric nosology. These core values, reflected in inter-
national treaties, legislation, conventions, religious and
philosophical writings and judicial opinions, shape why
and how various mental states, conditions, behaviors,
drives and adaptations are classified as healthy or not.
While every value is subject to debate and disagreement,
both in terms of its meaning and the relative weight it
should bear in a classification, consensus about the im-
portance of core values such as self-determination and
human dignity is not only possible, but exists. Consensus
exists relative to what are key human rights, views about
human flourishing, conceptions of well-being and the core
functional requirements for daily living. DSM-5 reflects
this current consensus.
DSM-5 reflects norms about human flourishing and
human dignity that are linked to the importance of self-
determination, the ability to exercise voluntary, free
choice and to have opportunities to live life fully and in
accordance with one’s personal values. Not only do these
root the objectivity of DSM-5, it is almost impossible to
imagine that a non-normative categorization of human
mental health and illness could be achieved. Without
values and norms, a book about human mental states
and behavior would be a descriptive natural history and
nothing more.
Summary
The DSM-5 is a product of the desire to reduce human
suffering and, as such, it reflects the prevailing, if evolving,
values concerning what constitutes human flourishing.
This does not reduce the disorders defined in the manual
to mere tastes or preferences. Rather, it reflects the fact
that core values permeate the creation of every nosology,
that DSM-5 is no exception, and that a set of values
suffuse particular decisions to continue, create or drop
disorder categories. And this reality will be no different
with RDoC.
The DSM-5 has been explicitly described and built to
be a living document [16]. It will evolve as values shift
and its precision will sharpen as knowledge of the mind
and behavior and evidence about the efficacy of treatment
continue to grow. It is precisely the contingency of all
classification schemes in terms of values as well as the
state of knowledge about the causes of behavior that leads
to the need for ongoing revision, editing and updating of
the DSM.
What is important is to not obscure or deny the role
of values in formulating the DSM-5, but to be transparent
about their role and to seek out input about the ways
values and norms can be best captured by the manual.
This is why consultation with many professional groups,
patient advocacy organizations, and the general public was
a key feature of the process of developing DSM-5. The
values reflected in the nosology are not the product of
who has the power to impose a value-laden perspective,
but rather are the result of a commitment to reflect core
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have been subjected to critique, conversation, and emend-
ation by a wide and diverse audience.
Will RDoC eventually produce a more practical, accur-
ate and less controversial psychiatric nosology? It could be
decades before we know. But the idea that it will be some-
how value-free and objective because it begins with genes
instead of behavior is to impose a value on crude reduc-
tionism that will not lead to any more objectivity than can
be found in the pages of the DSM-5.
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